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Abstract 
This paper aims to test the hypothesis of the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ which states that banks 
became manufacturers of pseudo safe assets to meet a global shortage of safe assets in the pre-
crisis period. In this narrative, securitization is the mechanism which enables banks to become 
underwriters of safe assets. This paper takes this hypothesis to the data and attempts to estimate 
the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. In particular, this paper exploits a 
regulatory change that occurred in 1987 when the OCC expanded the scope of assets US national 
banks could securitize. By using state-chartered banks as a control group and estimating a diff-in-
diff model, I find that securitization significantly increased banks’ systemic exposure. I then 
provide evidence on changes of banks’ balance sheet features to pinpoint a direct channel through 
which securitization may have increased banks’ systemic exposure. 
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Introduction 
Both the subprime mortgage crisis and Eurozone sovereign-debt crisis can be understood 
as crises of pseudo-safe assets engineered by the private sector in the US and issued by fiscally-
weak countries in Europe. The ‘Safe Asset narrative’ assumes that a global shortage of safe assets 
facilitated the excessive issuance of debt instruments during the pre-crisis period. In such a 
scheme, the development of securitization may have been a channel through which the safe-asset 
shortage materialized in the real economy. Indeed, securitization allowed banks to engineer 
pseudo-safe assets by transforming pools of illiquid assets (mortgage, commercial and retail loans) 
into liquid (tradable) securities. The resulting assets were labelled as “safe” prior to the crisis even 
though they could not insure against systemic risk. 
This paper aims to test the hypothesis that banks engaged in securitization as a response to 
a safe assets shortage, thus becoming manufacturers of ‘safe assets’ and underwriters of insurance 
against systemic risk. In particular, I deliver causal evidence on the effects of securitization on 
banks’ systemic exposure. Assessing the impact of securitization on banks’ exposure to systemic 
risk presents an empirical challenge as securitization indirectly fueled the growth of a national real 
estate mortgage market, thus indirectly exposing banks to systemic shocks. I overcome this 
identification challenge by estimating the causal impact of a regulatory change that affected US 
banks independently from their connections to the real estate market. By exploiting a regulatory 
change to the range of permissible assets that national banks could securitize and using state-
chartered banks as a control group, I find that securitization significantly increased banks’ systemic 
exposure. 
Having established a causal link between securitization and banks’ systemic exposure, I 
provide further evidence on structural changes to banks’ balance sheets so as to identify the 
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channel through which national banks increased their exposure to systemic risk. In doing so, I test 
the empirical prediction of the ‘Safe Assets narrative’. In the new ‘Originate and distribute’ 
banking model that developed after 1990, banks were allowed to originate assets and redistribute 
the associated risks through securitization instead of keeping those assets on their balance sheets. 
I find that national banks significantly decreased the share of their loans financed by deposits, 
which implies that banks increased their reliance on alternative sources of funding to finance their 
lending activities. This evidence is consistent with my initial hypothesis and pinpoints a channel 
through which securitization may have increased banks’ systemic exposure. Had securitization 
been aimed at merely diversifying the banks’ funding structure, we would not observe such 
increase in systemic exposure. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing economic 
literature on the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ and provide theoretical motivation for my empirical 
hypothesis. Section 3 presents my identification strategy and Section 4 describes the data. Section 
5 and 6 present the results of my diff-in-diff estimation and further evidence of changes to banks’ 
balance sheet features. Section 7 concludes.  
 
Literature Review & Theoretical Motivation 
The ‘Safe Asset Narrative’ of Financial Crises 
A recent strand of economic literature on the demand and supply of monetary aggregates 
has emerged to explain the cyclical over-issuance of debt instruments leading to debt crises.i In 
this framework, monetary aggregates – the so-called ‘safe assets’- encompass money  and money-
like financial instruments that are used as cash and transacted without much concern for adverse 
selection in financial markets. Unlike the ‘Minskyan approach’ which emphasizes the role of 
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agents’ expectations about the value of liquidity,ii  the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ focuses on the global 
asymmetric issuance of safe assets and assumes that a global shortage of safe assets during the 
pre-crisis period facilitated the excessive issuance of debt instruments in advanced economies who 
were suppliers of those scare assets. In this framework, the subprime mortgage crisis can be 
comprehended as a crisis of pseudo-safe assets engineered by the private sector in the US to meet 
the needs of a globally integrated financial system. 
In spite of its intuitive explanatory power, this narrative is difficult to test empirically. In 
this regard, Gorton, Lewellen and Metrick provide some evidence of a structural change to the 
manufacturing of safe assets. While the share of safe assets has remained constant over the last 30 
years, the authors point at the change in the components of this share. Governments and banks – 
traditional manufacturers of safe assets through sovereign debt issuance and banks’ deposits 
certificates – have been replaced by the “shadow banking” sector, which now produces a 
substantial fraction of those assets. Indeed, money market mutual funds shares, commercial papers, 
repurchase agreements and securitized debt are all money-like instruments that can be used as 
collateral in financial markets.  
 
The ‘Safe Asset Narrative’ in Practice: Securitization and Systemic Risk 
Focusing on the rise of structured finance is therefore key to test the validity of the ‘Safe 
Asset narrative’. Indeed, this narrative implicitly assumes that the development of a new ‘Originate 
and distribute’ banking model was a response to the growing demand for safe assets from global 
investors. In this model, banks originate loans and resell them to outside investors instead of 
keeping those assets on their balance sheets. This process effectively distributes the associated 
risks to the rest of the financial sector and release banks from the constraint of keeping illiquid 
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assets on their balance sheet. This new model essentially offers alternative funding sources to the 
banks who are no longer dependent on their customers’ deposits. If the development of the 
‘Originate and distribute’ funding model was a response to the safe asset shortage, the banks’ 
manufacturing of new financial instruments would be tantamount to the underwriting of insurance 
against systemic risk. In this regard, securitization was a channel trough which banks financed the 
origination of illiquid loans through the issuance of liquid, thus tradable securities. It is both a risk 
transfer and liquidity transformation mechanism whose resulting securitized products were bought 
for their perceived safety prior to the crisis.iii 
According to the ‘Safe Asset narrative’, the development of securitization should therefore 
be concomitant to an increase of banks’ systemic exposure. In their survey of the economic 
literature on the effect of growing interconnectedness and increased contagion risk in financial 
networks, Paul Glasserman and H. Peyton Young highlight the unsolved question of whether more 
interconnectedness tend to amplify or dampen systemic shocks. The ambiguous role played by 
securitization is at the heart of this tradeoff. On the one hand, banks can diversify their funding, 
thus better insuring themselves against systemic risk. On the other hand, securitization creates new 
obligations and increases the dominance of funding liquidity on market liquidity. The bank lending 
activity is more subject to adverse shocks as its financing depends on third agents’ perception of 
the resulting security liquidity.  
Glasserman and Young illustrate the groundwork for models of interconnected balance 
sheets with a basic intuitive scheme. Figure 1 show the stylized balance sheet of a bank 𝑖 who has 
two categories of assets. ‘Outside assets’ 𝑐𝑖 are claims on non-financial entities such as households 
or corporations while ‘In-network assets’ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 are claims on any financial entity 𝑘 such as banks or 
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asset managers. Likewise, the bank has ‘Outside liabilities’ 𝑏𝑖 towards depositors and ‘In-network 




I used their stylized representation of banks’ balance sheets to contrast the ‘traditional 
banking’ model with the ‘Originate and distribute’ model. The two figures represent the structural 
features of a bank’s balance sheet in the two distinctive banking models. In the traditional banking 
model, the bank finances the origination of its outside assets with outside liabilities, thus somehow 
isolating its traditional lending business from market fluctuations. In the ‘Originate and distribute 
model’, the bank combines outside liabilities and in-network liabilities to finance its outside assets. 
Implicitly, this structure increases the bank’s financing liquidity and allows the bank to increase 
the size of its outside assets. Consequently, this stylized representation of a bank’s balance sheet 
sheds light on the new risk of asymmetry caused by securitization. The origination of bank assets 
is made increasingly dependent on the liquidity of asset-backed securities and their perceived 
safety.   
Estimating the effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure is therefore key to 
explore the tradeoff between better risk diversification and increased dominance of the safe asset 
liquidity on the banks’ origination business. Indeed, securitization may have been a channel 
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through which the safe asset global shortage materialized. Before the financial crisis of 2007, the 
general consensus was that securitization supported financial stability.iv This view was prevalent 
among policy makers such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which 
recognized the benefits of securitization: 
The need for liquidity and the ability to engage in sound asset-liability 
management practices is all the more important to the maintenance of a safe 
and sound banking system.v 
 
Securitization was aimed to cater investors’ need for safe assets as the payments tranching allowed 
to meet several liquidity needs:  
Structural credit enhancement and diversified asset pool free investors of the 
need to obtain a detailed understanding of the underlying loans.vi 
 
Consequently, the development of securitization can be viewed as a ‘safe asset’ engine. If 
securitization was adopted to create a safe asset, thus turning banks into underwriters of systemic 
risk insurance, we should observe an increase in treated banks’ systemic exposure. Testing this 
hypothesis could shed light on the role played by bank regulation in enabling this structural change. 
 
Identification: The ‘Security Pacific Letter’  
Identification       
This paper aims to estimate the causal effect of securitization as a new funding source on 
banks’ systemic exposure. Disentangling the effect of securitization as a new funding source from 
contemporaneous changes in banks’ systemic exposure represents an empirical challenge. Indeed, 
the effect of securitization is twofold. On the asset side, securitization can indirectly increase a 
bank’s exposure to systemic risk if the greater amount of assets originated are highly correlated 
with systemic events. In the US, securitization fueled the growth of mortgage-backed securities.vii 
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Together with other government policies that encouraged home ownership through various tax 
subsidies and home finance programs, securitization turned the real-estate market into a national 
one and strengthened the transmission line between a shock to the real economy and a bank crisis. 
Analyzing the role played by securitization in the increase of banks’ systemic exposure could 
therefore lead to overestimation. The aim of my identification strategy is thus to test the direct 
effect of securitization as an alternative funding source for banks, independently from its indirect 
effects on the underlying assets markets. I overcome this identification challenge by exploiting a 
regulatory change regarding securitization which is independent from the story of the real estate 
mortgages in the US. 
 
The ‘Security Pacific Letter’ 
In this section, I argue that the 1987 ‘Security Pacific Letter’ constitutes a valid natural 
experiment to test the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure by differentiating 
between national commercial banks and state-chartered banks responses.  
In the 1980s, the process of securitizing bank assets became much easier.viii In a 1987 letter 
to Security Pacific National Bank – the so-called ‘Security Pacific Letter’–, the OCC expanded the 
scope of permissible assets national bank could resell as securitized products. In spite of the 
applicable Glass Steagall Act, the OCC allowed the underwriting of securitized assets by stating 
that national banks could securitize and sell ‘any of their […] lawfully acquired assets’. The 
supervisor of federal-chartered banks assumed that the pass-through certificates – representing 
claims on the trust holding the underlying illiquid assets - were not ‘securities’ within the meaning 
of Glass-Steagall Act and that securitization did not consist in the securities underwriting of the 
securities business. The Comptroller’s ruling was challenged by the Securities Industry 
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Association which argued that the OCC’s decision allowed national banks to deal in securities, 
thus creating a breach to the GSA which clearly separated the banking business from the securities 
business. The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the OCC ruling in 1989. The court stated that:  
If the activity constitutes the “business of banking,” then the Glass-Steagall Act 
prohibitions … do not apply. (885 F. 2d 1034, 1048) 
 
Hence,  the court’s decision sanctioned the sale by a national bank of any type of securitized assets, 
including the banks’ own consumer credit card receivables, automobile and boat loans, 
commercial loans and leases.ix Following this court ruling, the OCC started approving many 
securitization programs of national banks after 1989.  
I propose to use this regulatory cutoff to isolate the effect that securitization had on national 
banks, independently from the underlying securitized assets. This regulatory change represents an 
empirical setting where I can differentiate between a treatment and control group, thus satisfying 
an essential condition of causal inference in observational studies. In this setting, state-chartered 
banks constitute an ideal control group as they were subject to the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) but 
not to the OCC ruling. Indeed, the GSA provisions applied to all FDIC insured banks, be they 
state-chartered or federally-supervised while OCC rulings only applied to national banks. Given 
that both state-chartered banks and national banks were subject to the GSA, I propose to use state-
chartered banks as a control in this natural experiment. My identification strategy therefore 
consists in estimating the change in a bank’s systemic exposure following the regulatory change, 
based on whether or not the FDIC insured bank was a state-chartered bank (control) or a national 
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Data & Methodology 
The banks’ betas are used as proxies for their systemic exposure. A bank beta (𝛽𝑖) arises 
from co-movements of the stock price with the market and therefore captures the systemic 
component of a firm’s stock price as opposed to its idiosyncratic component.  
I obtained the lists of all FDIC insured banks from 1982 to 1992 from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation website. Estimating my model using FDIC-insured banks only – be they 
state-chartered (control) or OCC-chartered (treatment) – was key to ensure that they were subject 
to the same regulations prior to 1987. The FDIC dataset indicates whether each affiliated bank was 
supervised by the OCC or had a state charter. I matched this dataset with the banks’ betas time 
series that I retrieved from the Bloomberg database. To do so, I used the FDIC variable indicating 
whether the individual bank was held by a holding company and obtained a list of state-chartered 
banks and OCC-chartered banks at the consolidated level. Given that each bank in the control 
group needs to be state-chartered and that the outcome variable is observed at the level of the 
holding company (‘consolidated’) only, matching the data at the consolidated level avoids 
identifying treated banks as state-chartered (control) in situations where the holding company of 
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Using a market-based measure of systemic risk puts a constraint on my sample. Indeed, many of 
the affiliated banks, be they national or state-chartered, were privately held. In order to obtain the 
most accurate measure of national and state-chartered banks’ systemic risk, I decided to remove 
all holding companies’ whose subsidiaries were not only banks but also insurance companies or 
other financial firms (‘diversified financials’). Indeed, the other lines of businesses of such 
companies would have created uninformative noise to my response variable.  I also checked that 





Lastly, I retrieved data on some of my sample banks’ total assets, total loans, total deposits 
and total liabilities from Mergent Online, a database of corporate information covering US and 
foreign companies from 1982 onward. A first overview of the differences in banks’ systemic 
exposure before and after the 1987 regulatory cutoff date is provided below. The changes in the 
distribution of the OCC-chartered banks’ betas should serve as a preliminary guess regarding the 
sign and magnitude of the causal effect of securitization.  
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To assess the internal validity of my empirical strategy, I first used my sample to test the 
parallel trend assumption, which is critical to any diff-in-diff identification strategy. Ensuring that 
both the control and treatment group have parallel trends in their outcomes values prior to the 
treatment should support the appropriateness of the chosen control group as a counterfactual. I 
therefore plotted the moving average of each bank’s stock beta time series, covering the period 
from 1982 to 1992.  Figure 3 shows the moving average trend of each bank group – national and 
state-chartered banks.  
Consistent with my identification assumption, Figure 3 shows that state-chartered and 
national banks’ betas followed the same trend prior to 1987 when the OCC released the ‘Security 
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Pacific Letter’. I formally tested the robustness of this identification assumption in section 5.C. 
 
 
The Effect of Securitization on Banks’ Systemic Exposure 
Model Specification  
 
I used the banks panel data to estimate the following diff-in-diff model:  
βit =  αi +  st +  θ Dit + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
In this model, each bank 𝑖’s beta at time 𝑡 – thereafter denoted  βit –  is regressed on its entity fixed 
effects αi, time fixed effects st and a treatment dummy Dit.  
Dit = {
= 1,  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 1987
= 0,  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Note that the coefficient of interest in this regression model is θ, whose sign and magnitude 
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Results 
 Dependent variable: 
   
OLS 
OLS 
with Standard clustered errors 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
Treatment θ 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Constant 0.683* 0.683* 
 (0.407) (0.407) 
Time fixed effects YES YES 
Entity fixed effects YES YES 
Observations 27,639 27,639 
R2 0.491 0.490 
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.479 
Residual Std. Error 
0.404  
(df = 27067) 
 
F Statistic (df = 571; 
27067) 
45.672*** 45.672*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 1: The ‘Security Pacific Letter’ effect on national banks’ systemic exposure 
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Table 1 reports the main results from the estimated model. Column 1 shows the point 
estimates derived using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Column 2 shows the point estimates of the 
same model estimated with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
The two estimated coefficients have high statistical significance (one percent) and are 
robust to clustered standard errors. The point estimates on the treatment dummy variable are pretty 
consistent across all estimated models and robust to outlying values. The above estimated model 
thus suggests that the OCC decision increased national banks’ systemic exposure by 0.07. The 
tables consequently support the view that exposure to securitization increased banks’ systemic 
exposure.  
 
Robustness of Parallel Trend Assumption  
In order to assess the robustness of my identification assumption, I estimated the following 
model:  
βit =  αi +  st +  ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝑖 (Gi  × 𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
In this model, I regress banks’ betas on time and entity fixed effects and an interaction term 
between time fixed effects st and a dummy variable Gi indicating whether the bank 𝑖 belonged to 
the treatment group (national bank) or control group (state-chartered bank).  
Gi = {
= 1,  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
= 0,  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
 
This model aims at testing the parallel trend assumption, which is a necessary condition to 
estimate causality in a difference-in-differences empirical setting. In particular, estimating the 
difference in the mean response of the treatment and control group implies that the assignment of 
treatment should be insignificant before the treatment date. The coefficients of interest in this 
specification are therefore the series of coefficients on the interaction term between group 
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assignment and time fixed effects 𝜌𝑡. In the hypothesis that state-chartered banks constitute a valid 
control group, the series of 𝜌𝑡 should equal 0 before the regulatory cutoff date and be significantly 
different from 0 after the treatment.  
The time series of 𝜌𝑡 and their 99% confidence intervals are plotted in figure 4.  
 
Figure 5 : Time series of the Group assignment statistical significance 
      
Figure 4 supports the parallel trend assumption of this empirical setting. The point 
estimates are statistically insignificant before 1987 and present statistical significance after 1990.  
 
Discussion: Identification of a potential direct channel 
My results consequently point at an indirect effect of securitization on banks’ systemic 
exposure. However, this empirical setting does not allow me to pinpoint the direct channel through 
which the regulation impacted banks’ balance sheet and therefore their systemic exposure. To 
identify the potential channel explaining the estimated indirect effect,  I used the panel data on 
banks’ balance sheets retrieved from Mergent online. Based on random sample of 50 banks, I 
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found data on only 25 banks’ balance sheets. I then computed the Loan to Deposits ratio of each 
bank in 1986 and 1992. I propose this ratio as a proxy for the share of a bank’s lending activity 
that is financed through deposits. In a traditional banking model, this ratio should therefore be 
close to 1 as the bank only uses outside liabilities (deposits) to fund the origination of outside 
assets (loans).  Table 3 shows the growth rate of the Loan to Deposits Ratios for both national and 
state-chartered banks between 1986 and 1992.  
 
 
I decided not to run any formal diff-in-diff model because of the small sample size. Instead, 
this data is only aimed at giving a hint of the direct mechanism at stake and should serve as a basis 
for future research using this empirical setting. Both national and state-chartered banks decreased 
their loan to deposits ratios. Hence, the share of outside assets financed by outside liabilities 
decreased for both groups of banks, thus explaining a common upward trend of in their systemic 
exposure. Furthermore, the difference in percentage growth shed light on the effect of 
securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. The decline in the share of outside assets funded by 
outside liabilities between 1986 and 1992 is significantly higher for national banks. This result 
suggests that national banks were able to increase the size of their loan portfolio through In-
network liabilities, thus increasing their exposure to systemic risk.  
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These results are consistent with the ‘Safe Asset narrative’. In particular, the causal 
increase in banks’ systemic risk as a result of securitization validates a key prediction of the safe 
asset framework. Indeed, had the banks engaged in securitization for other reasons than meeting a 
shortage of safe assets through the engineering of liquid securities, we would not necessarily have 
observed an increase in their systemic risk. Securitization would have merely resulted in a change 
in the funding structure of the banks and the better diversification of their funding sources may 
have resulted even in lower systemic risk. Instead, my results pinpoint at a mechanism that is 
accounted for in the ‘safe asset narrative’. Securitization did not only result in a change in the 
funding structure of banks but also incentivized them to originate new outside assets so as to sell 
pseudo safe securities to in-network investors. Hence, the increase in banks’ systemic risk puts in 
evidence a change in banks’ incentives and their engagement in a new business aimed at catering 
a growing demand for safe assets. Instead of attempting to measure changes in global investors’ 
demand for safe assets in order to validate the ‘safe asset narrative’, my approach thus looks for 
evidence on the sell-side of new incentives created by a safe asset shortage.  
 
Conclusion  
This paper presents new evidence on the causal effect of bank deregulation on banks’ 
systemic exposure. By using state-chartered banks as a control group and exploiting a regulatory 
change to the permissibility of securitization, I find that securitization significantly increased 
banks’ systemic exposure.   
These findings provide further empirical evidence for the validity of the ‘Safe Asset 
narrative’. Consistently with the intuition of this narrative, banks seemed to have increased the 
underwriting of safe assets through securitization, thus mechanically increasing their exposure to 
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systemic risk. While the estimated causal effect shows that securitization has an indirect effect on 
banks’ systemic exposure, I use banks’ balance sheet data to pinpoint the structural changes at the 
bank level that drove this result. I find that banks that were able to securitize their assets 
significantly increased the share of in-network liabilities used to finance the origination of assets. 
Thus, securitization seems to act as an alternative funding source for banks, thereby increasing 
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